In 1931, the deficit on balance of trade in goods and services amounted to -2% of GDP. The import bill for food, beverages and tobacco amounted to 8.6% of GDP. Add in the raw materials bill, and a manufacturing surplus of just £72 million could do little to offset the 12.3% GDP bill for essential imports in food and basic commodities. Invisible earnings, which would normally finance the import bills had been hit by a fall in revenues particularly shipping revenues as world trade collapsed.
The UK government faced a crisis which was to lead to Sterling leaving the Gold standard and a devaluation from the level of $4.86 to the dollar. Eat less and export more was the call to remedy the problem.
In 1948, A net trade deficit of just under 2% precipitated the devaluation of Sterling from $4.20 to $2.80. As always the mantra, eat less, export more was prevalent. A food bill of some £450 million amounted to just under 4% of GDP. Including raw materials, the total amounted to 7% of GDP. The UK was struggling to finance the deficit either in terms of manufacturing surplus or invisibles surplus.
By 1950, according to Coutts and Rawthorn, the UK was a great industrial power with more than a third of its labour force employed in the manufacturing sector. There was a trade surplus in manufactured goods equal to 10% of GDP and the country was a net exporter of energy. All appeared to be well, the overall deficit was less than one half of one per cent.
In 1967, seventeen years the Labour government was obliged to run cap in hand to the IMF as a result of a balance of payments crisis. This lead to a further devaluation of the currency. The actual balance of payments numbers were inconsequential, confidence was everything and the Wilson government offered little. The pound in your pocket was unaffected as the devaluation from $2.80 to $2.40 was to unfold. The run on the pound had been triggered by a balance of payments deficit less than 1% of GDP.
Forty three years later in 2010, the UK had a deficit on food of just 1.2% of GDP, add in the bill for raw materials and the deficit amounted to less than 1.5%. Yet the overall deficit on trade in goods amounted to 6.7% of GDP. Since 1983, the UK has been running a persistent deficit on manufactured goods which has compounded the trade deficit problem. In 2010, the trade deficit on manufactured goods amounted to -4.6% of GDP.
The surplus on invisible account could not cover the trade deficit. The overall deficit in goods and services was -3.3% of GDP. In Q4 alone the deficit was -4% of GDP. The situation is worse than 1931, 1948 and 1967. How did the UK get into this situation?
The paper “Forty years of UK Trade” analyses the deterioration in the UK Balance of Payments position. It will be published sometime next week. For those expecting to see the rebalancing of the economy towards net export growth following the devaluation of the currency once again, it should be an interesting read. The UK needs a strong banking and financial services sector to offset the manufacturing deficit. This is no time to be bashing the banks.
Prospects for the UK balance of Payments : Coutts, K. and Rowthorn, R. 2010 Civitas
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The views expressed are my own and in no way reflect pro.manchester policy. In no way should the comments be considered as investment advice or guidelines or reflect political bias. UK Economics news and analysis : no politics, no dogma, no polemics, just facts. JKA is a visiting professor at MMU Business School, an economist and specialist in Corporate Strategy, educated at LSE, London Business School with a PhD from Manchester Metropolitan University.
Lead to a further devaluation of the currency. The actual balance of payments figures were of no importance, confidence and the government was Wilson offered little.
Posted by: מתנות מקוריות | October 24, 2011 at 01:11 PM